Was the Holy Land betrayed in 1291? by Barber, Malcolm
Was the Holy Land betrayed in 1291? 
Article 
Published Version 
Barber, M. (2008) Was the Holy Land betrayed in 1291? 
Reading Medieval Studies, XXXIV. pp. 35­52. ISSN 0950­3129 
Available at http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/84766/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
Publisher: University of Reading 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
Was the Holy Land Betrayed In 12917 
Malcolm Barber 
University <fReadinB 
'By their fruits we can know them', declared the French royal 
lawyer, William of Plaisians, 'since through their fault the Holy 
Land was said to have been lost and they are said often to have 
made secret pacts with the Sultan.'1 William of Piaisians was onc 
of Philip the Fair's chief ministers and a close confidant of the king. 
On 29 May, 1308, in a great speech delivered in a public consistory at 
Poitiers, he sought to bully an obdurate Clement V into reopening 
the proceedings against the Templars, suspended by the pope 
the previous February after initial confessions of apostasy made 
by the leaders had been withdrawn. The choice of quotation was 
highly appropriate because Plaisians knew that his listeners would 
understand that he was referring to the gospel of Matthew, chapter 
7, which concludes the three chapters St Augustine had called the 
Sermon on the Mount. This seemed to fit the Templars very well, 
for Christ had warned the disciples to beware of false prophets, 
'which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are 
ravening wolves' (verse 15). On the face of it the Templars were the 
faithful servants of Christ, yet in ceremonies cloaked in secrecy 
they were really idolaters and traitors. 'Do men gather grapes of 
thorns, or figs of thistles? Even so every good tree bringeth forth 
good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit' (verses 16- 17). 
The answer was contained in verse 19: 'Every tree that bringcrh not 
forth good fruit is hewn down, and cast into the fire.' Surely the 
head of God's Church on earth could not continue to protect such 
an organisation. Indeed,John Burguny6, the Aragonese ambassador 
at the papal court, reported to KingJames II that the oral delivery of 
the speech was even more direct and explicit. It was, said Plaisians, 
'the general belief that the Holy Land was lost by their actions' and 
that in Spain they had actually gone over to the Saracens and joined 
in attacks upon the kingdom of Aragon. How this contrasted with 
the sacrifices of the royal house of France; both the present king's 
father and grandfather had died on crusade, as had so many barons 
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and others from France. 'The Church of God has been extended 
and put down roots and foundations in the blood of these and other 
kings:2 
William of Plaisians' audience had, of course, an obvious 
reference point in the loss of the city of Acre to the Mamluks in 
May, 1291, an event still a raw memory for many contemporaries. 
for its fall had been the catalyst for the complete collapse of what 
remained of the crusader states in Palestine and Syria. 'Know, fair 
lords', said an eyewitness, the chronicler known as the Templar of 
Tyre, 'that no one could adequately recount the tears and grief of 
that day. The pitiful sight of the little children, tumbled about and 
disembowelled as the horses trampled them ... ' There is no man in 
the world who has so very hard a heart that he would not have wept 
to see the slaughter. And I am sure that all the Christian people who 
saw these things that day wept, because even some of the Saracens, 
as we learned afterwards, had pity on these victims and wepr.'3 
However, as the French govern menr presented it, the worm of 
corruption within the Temple had burrowed much deeper. In the 
order for the arrest of September, 1307, the Templars were accused 
of holding secret reception ceremonies in which new entrants were 
obliged to deny Christ and spit on a crucifix and then, naked, were 
kissed by their receptors on the base of the spi,!e, navel and mouth. 
Once accepted into the Order, they became part of a system in 
which compulsory sodomy and the worship of idols were central 
tenets. 4 The loss of Acre was therefore the external manifestation 
of this internal decay, indeed, the culmination of a betrayal which 
had found its origins over a century before in the time of Saladin. 
When, during hi s second appearance before the papal commission 
in Paris on 28 November, 1309, the Grand Master, James of Molay, 
attempted a stutteri ng declaration of the Orders qualities, he was 
brusquely interrupted by William of Nogaret, the royal Keeper of 
the Seals, and Philip IV's chief minister. Nogaret claimed that ' in the 
chronicles of Saint-Denis it was written that in the time of Saladin, 
the Sultan of Babylon, the then Master of the Order of the Temple 
and other leading members of the Order had done homage to this 
Saladin, that the same Saladin, on hearing of the heavy defeat the 
Templars had just suffered, had publicly declared that the Templars 
had suffered the said defeat because they were labouring under the 
vice of sodomy and had violated their religion and their statutes'. ' 
Molay expressed his astonishment at this story - and, indeed, it 
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does not appear in any known version of the chronicles - but the 
contemporary collection known as Les Grandes Chroniques de France, 
which was similarly produced at the monastery of St Denis, does 
allege that the belt which all Templars wore was a symbol oftheir 
treason with the Muslims. 6 
If Plaisians was exaggerating when he portrayed the Catholic 
Church as nourished by the blood of French kings, it was nevertheless 
true that recent members of the Capetian family had sacrificed their 
lives in the conflict with Islam. Philip IV 's grandfather, Louis IX, 
canonised in 1297, was the king's evident role model, and he had 
ended his days before Tunis in 1270 on his second attempt to come 
to grips with the infidel. Twenty years before, during St Louis' first 
crusade, the great expedition against Egypt, his younger brother, 
Robert of Artois, had been hacked to death in the narrow streets of 
the city of Mansourah . Yet, in the early fourteenth century, there 
was little to show for two centuries of suffering; the Holy Land 
was firmly in the hands of the Mamluks, while the main Christian 
possession in the eastern Mediterranean, the island of Cyprus, 
maintained only a shaky presence in a world the Christians had 
believed was their own heritage. Plaisians knew that past events 
had engendered resentments. The Mansourah debacle had clearly 
been caused by the recklessness of the count of Artois, yet it had 
been preceded by a shouting match in which the Templars had tried 
to prevent what they evidently saw as a suicidal assault. ' Although 
they were right, in some quarters this had hardly redounded to their 
credit, for it was said that the military orders had a vested interest 
in continuing the holy wars which legitimised their existence and 
therefore did not wish to see the Muslims decisively defeated. ' 
After 1291 western Christians needed a focus for their grief and 
disillusionment; Plaisians' rhetorical brutality and Nogaret's sly 
insinuations were calculated to depict the Order of the Temple as 
the canker within the body of Christendom itself. 
These perceptions of the Temple have had a long life. It was 
firmly embedded in the popular imagination in Britain in the early 
nineteenth century, not the least through the immensely successful 
novels of Sir Walter Scott. In Ivanhoe (1819), the Templar, Sir Brian de 
BOis-Guilbert, a haughty villain whose contempt for the principles 
of the founders of the Order is unrestrained, stains the reputation 
of the Order irredeemably with his conduct; but the action takes 
place in England, far from the lands where contact could be made 
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with Islam. More pertinent is The Talisman, published six years 
later. in which Brother Amaury, the Grand Master, is at the centre 
of all the intrigues which undermined the armies of the Third 
Crusade and the efforts of the hero-king, Richard the Lion-Heart. 
In a scene based on Saladin's execution of Raynald of Chatillon, his 
chief enemy among the Christians, after his victory at Hartin in 
July, U87, Saladin decapitates the Grand Master with a single blow. 
Alone among the Christian leaders, Brother Amaury is not allowed 
to accept the hospitality for which the sultan is famous. Saladin 
knew of the Master's numerous treacheries, while King Richard 
condemned him as a devil-worshipper and a necromancer, actions 
ultimately based on an obsessive desire to further the interests of the 
Order before all else. Not surprisingly, such a man did not baulk at 
making secret pacts with the Muslims. 
Scott dealt in the currency of fiction, but modern historians have 
found the idea of suspicious contacts with the Muslimsno less attractive. 
In Britain, the most influential historian of the crusades in the second 
half of the twentieth century was Sir Steven Runciman, who died in 
2001. Runciman's great three-volume history, which was published 
between 1951 and 1954, remains in print, and is still chosen by most 
readers who wish to follow a narrative history of the crusades in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, despite the half century of intensive 
research which has taken place since he wrote. He thought that, to a 
degree, the Templars had brought their misfortunes on themselves 
through the friendships they had made in the Muslim world and the 
financial dealings which this involved. These contacts had then led 
to an interest in Islamic religion and culture. 9 Runciman appears 
to have transposed this view directly from E. J. Martin's Trial of the 
Tentplars, published in 1928. According to Martin, William ofBeaujeu, 
the Master of the Temple who died at Acre in 1291, 'was accused of 
friendship with the Sultan, an accusation which persisted so strongly 
that it may have had some truth behind if." More recently, the French 
biographer of Philip the Fair, Jean Favier, in a study published in 1978, 
was similarly convinced although, unlike Runciman, he was not 
even willing to credit the Templars with any intellectual curiosity, 
believing that they had been contaminated by a process he describes 
as 'osmosis'. They were, he felt, too ignorant to have imbibed Islamic 
culture in any other way.il 
The connections are therefore obvious. By 1291 the Templars had 
had a continuous history in Syria and Palestine stretching back to 
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1ll9. This meant frequent contact with the Muslims of the Middle 
East and by one means or another they had absorbed the religion 
and cu lture of Islam to such an extent that, as the order for the 
arrests alleges, they had ' forgotten their origins', and had thus fallen 
into the pit of apostasy." The career of William of Beaujeu , the last 
Grand Master of the Order to govern from the Palestinian mainland, 
is therefore of key importance. If this view has any validity, it was 
during this man's mastership between 1273 and 1291 that 'the fruits', 
as Plaisians put it, came to maturity with the fall of Acre and the 
dramatic disappearance of the crusader states. But William of 
Beaujeu can hardly be described as one of Fa vier's ignorant Templars. 
He was a member of one of the leading noble houses in France, the 
fourth son of Guichard of Beaujeu, lord of Montpensier. His uncle, 
Humbert V of Beaujeu, was the first cousin of Louis VIII, King of 
France between 1223 and 1226 and the father of St Louis, and this 
explains why William refers to Charles of Anjou , King of Sicily and 
a younger brother of the saint , as his kinsman. Family members 
held important pOSitions in the royal service: Humbert V, who died 
on crusade in Egypt in 1250, was a constable of France, a post later 
held by Humbert of Beaujeu-Montpensier, William's elder brother." 
William himself had wide experience in the Orde, of the Temple, 
having joined by 1253 at the latest." He was Preceptor of Tripoli in 
1260, when he was captured by the Mongols, and later Preceptor of 
Sicily during the reign of Charles of Anjou. He was elected master 
in 1273, attended the great council of Lyon in 1274, which had been 
called primarily to discuss new crusading projects, and finally had 
left for the East in 1275, having gathered men, equipment and horses 
to reinforce the Templars in Palestine." At Lyon he had called for 
arms, provisions, troops and ships, for the Holy Land was lacking 
in all ofthem.16 
When he arrived the Latin settlements wereindeed in dire trouble. 
Harassed by Mongols and Mamluks alike they were quite unable to 
take any effective initiatives in the conflict with Islam. William of 
Beaujeu was in no position to adopt frontal tactics; instead he followed 
a cautious policy of non~provocation and negotiation. When James 
of Molay was drafted into the Templar frontline in the late 12705, he 
recalled that he and other young knights, 'who want to see feats of 
arms', were critical of the master because he 'was submissive to the 
sultan and kept himself in his favour'. However, they soon realised 
that the master 'could not act otherwise because at that time their 
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Order possessed and held in its power and under its cllswdy many 
cites and strongholds in the said sultan's territories',17 References 
during the trial show that Beaujeu's relations with the Mamluks 
were known to the lower ranks of the Order even among those 
who had not served overseas. In May, 1311, in a deposition markedly 
hostile to the leadership, Hugh of Narsac, a serving brother who 
had been Preceptor ofles Epeaux in the diocese ofSaintes, claimed 
that errors had been introduced into the Order a long time ago in 
the East, where Beaujeu and a Templar knight called Matthew Ie 
Sauvage had had frequent contacts with the sultan with whom they 
had 'a great friendship'. He must have learnt this from returning 
brothers. Peter of Noblat, another serving brother from the diocese 
of Limoges, who had been in the East for six years during Beaujeu's 
mastership, spoke of the master's 'great friendship with the sultan 
and the Saracens'. like Molay, he understood that 'otherwise neither 
he nor the Order could have remained in Outremer at that time'.ls 
Respites were essential. In 1282 Beaujeu and the Sultan, Qalawun, 
Signed a truce for ten years and ten months covering extensive 
tracts of territory. A key component was the port of Tortosa, held 
by the Templars, which would, said Ibn 'Abd az-Zahir, secretary and 
biographer ofthe sultans Baybars and Qalawun, 'enjoy security and 
tranqUillity'; but at the same time no one frofT! there could invade 
any of the sultan's lands nor pillage any of his ships which might 
be damaged or wrecked on that coast. 'In the territory of Tortosa 
mentioned in the treaty no fort or fortification is to be repaired, nor 
any reinforcement, entrenchment or the like built." 9 The Muslims 
would never accept a permanent peace and this was the best that 
could have been arranged in the circumstances. 
Conciliation was underpinned by spying. The Templar of Tyre, 
who was not a member of the Order, but acted as the master's 
secretary and interpreter, describes how Beaujeu obtained advance 
information about the Mamluk military plans. 'There was a very 
old emir, one of the four who governed the Paynimie; he made my 
lord the master of the Temple aware of these developments. This 
emir was called the Emir Silah, and he was accustomed to notify 
the master of the Temple of matters of interest to Christendom, 
when the sultan wished to injure Christianity in any manner. This 
contact cost the master fine presents each year, which he sent to 
him.' Again, this was known within the Order, at least in general 
terms, for Hugh of Narsac said that William of Beaujeu had some 
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Saracens in his pay. which the master said was for their greater 
security. 'but others contradicted this'.20 When the Sultan Qalawun 
began preparations for the assault on Acre, the emir, whose proper 
name was Badr ai-Din Bektash al-Fakhri, sent a warning to Beaujeu. 
This emir was, said the Templar ofTyre, 'the friend of the master of 
the Temple'." Not all Templar masters had enjoyed the favours of 
such a contact, but none of them had acted without negotiators and 
interpreters. In II67 a leading Templar, Geoffrey Fulcher, was a key 
figure in negotiations with Egypt during a period when Amalric, 
King of Jerusalem, looked to have some chance of taking over the 
country, for he accompanied Hugh ofCeasarea, the royal envoy, into 
the actual presence ofthe caliph in his palace in Cairo" Negotiation 
with Muslim powers was quite usual and the hierarchical statutes of 
the Templar Rule, which date from the II60s at the latest, lay down 
that the master, the seneschal and the commanders of the Kingdom 
of Jerusalem, the City of Jerusalem and of Tripoli and Antioch, 
should all be supplied with Saracen scribes." 
While William of Beaujeu's temporising policies may look to 
modern eyes to have the stamp of common sense, they bore little 
relation to the images of the heroes of the First Crusade, epitomised 
by Godfrey of Bouillon, the first ruler of Jerusalem, whose exploits 
had passed into legend even in the twelfth century, and whose 
story was the common property of western Christians. Moreover, 
Beaujeu's reputation was not helped by his perceived partisanship, 
for he supported Charles of Anjou's controversial claim to the 
throne of Jerusalem in opposition to King Hugh of Cyprus, and thus 
contributed to the development of faction at a time of acute external 
threat." The Templar of Tyre himself, although a great admirer of 
Beaujeu, describes how warnings sent by the master, first to Tripoli 
in 1289 and again at Acre in 1291, were not believed because his 
motives were suspected. Z5 
When the assault finally began on 5 April , 1291, William of 
Beaujeu's politics were of little relevance, for it soon became a 
brutal and ultimately one-sided battle for survival. The Templars 
and Hospitallers were stationed on the walls of Montmusard, from 
where, on the night of 15 April. the Templars led a sortie against 
the troops from Hama. Initially successful, they were soon beaten 
off, falling back in confusion as they tripped over the tent ropes in 
the darkness." The city held out for another month and then on 
18 May the Mamluks broke into the Accursed Tower and street 
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fighting began. William of Beaujeu, unprepared and only lightly 
armed, ru shed out to help, but it was his last act. Fatally wounded, 
he was carried to the Templar quarter on the northern side of the 
city, where he died that evening. He was about sixty years old, The 
Templars fought on but as the Mamluks made ever greater inroads 
into the city they were forced back into their own compound. already 
heaving with people, At this point Theobald Gaudin, the Templar 
Grand Commander, took ship to Sidon, tak.ing some of the Templars 
with him, while Peter of Sevfey, the Marshal, attempted to resist 
the inevitable Mamluk onslaught, The last Templars in the city met 
their deaths when a tower, undermined by sappers, collapsed on top 
ofthem,27 
If the Templars had betrayed Acre, ai-Ashraf showed no sign of 
recognising it, for the brothers were slaughtered along with all the 
others who failed to find a place on the few ships available, Peter 
of Sevrey was tricked into believing that ai-Ashraf was willing 
to negotiate, only to be seized and beheaded, As for William of 
Beaujeu himself, the Templar of Tyre was not the only witness to 
his bravery during the last days, James of Pia ny, who testified during 
the Templar, trial in Cyprus in 1311, said that 'the master well could 
have escaped and fled if he had wished at the capture of the city of 
Acre, just as many other religious and secular knights fled, but he 
preferred to die for the Catholic faith and its defence, and he wanted 
to shed his blood for Christ against the enemies of the faith , just 
as Christ did for our redemption'," William of Beaujeu lingered 
for a day, but captured Templars suffered the equivalent of a living 
death for many years. Matthew Zaccaria, a Genoese imprisoned 
with some Templars in Cairo, told the Cypriot tribunal in 13II that 
those held with him resisted all inducements to apostasize, saying 
that 'they (would not) deny the Christian faith, but wanted to die in 
the good faith of Christ, and (live) all their days there in captivity", 
rather than do anything against the health of their souls".''' 
The loss ofthe remaining footholds on the Palestinian mainland 
created a crisis for both the major military orders, the Hospitallers 
as well as the Templars, and naturally they were subject to close 
scrutiny in the following years, 30 The military orders presented critics 
with a clear target. The Templars were particularly vulnerable, since 
their military role was at the core of their ideology, whereas the 
Hospitallers had been founded to take care of the sick and only took 
on military duties after the Templars had come into existence. Tax-
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payers, both secular and clerical, inevitably wanted to know what 
had become of all the resources poured into the defence of the Holy 
Land in the decades before 1291. Even before the end, vociferous 
criticS had been demanding that expenditure be curbed or that some 
result be achieved before the whole edifice came crashing down . One 
common solution was the union of the two great military orders, 
which, some argued, undermined the Christian cause through 
their rivalry, as well as duplicating their functions and thus costing 
more than they should. J! In 1307, in response to an order from Pope 
Clement V, both grand masters were required to set down their 
thoughts about such proposals. James of Malay was strongly opposed, 
pointing out the differences between them, but more importantly 
arguing that the idea of union had been considered a generation 
before at the council of Lyon in 1~74, and had been rejected at that 
time. The only reason for its revival he contended, was that when 
the Holy Land was lost in 1291, 'the Romans and other nations were 
complaining loudly that effective help for the defence of that land 
had not been sent' and the reigning pope, Nichol as IV, had dragged 
up this old notion 'as some sort of excuse of his role, and to give the 
appearance that he wished to bring a solution to the business of the 
Holy Land '." As Malay saw it, the idea arose not fr9m any genuine 
desire for reform, but from the politics of the Roman curia, where 
evasion of responsibility demanded the shifting of blame. 
In fact, since his election as master in 1292 James of Molay 
had worked hard at organising resources for the war with Islam: 
young knights had been drafted to the frontline in Cyprus, ships 
hired, raids made against the Egyptian and Syrian coasts. Between 
1293 and 1296 Molay went on an extended visit to Aragon, France, 
England and Italy, where he met the secu lar rulers who could be the 
greatest help in gathering forces and money for a new assault, as well 
as the pope, and held chapter-meetings with the Templar brothers 
in order to increase awareness of needs in the East. Between June 
and September, 1294, he concluded a major agreement with King 
James II of Aragon, in which the Order ceded its rights in Tortosa in 
Aragon to the crown in exchange for the castles of Ares, Cuevas and 
Pefiiscola in northern Valencia. 33 It seems reasonable to conclude 
that this was part of a future strategic plan to open up a considerable 
hinterland for the port at Pefiiscola through which supplies to 
Cyprus cou ld be channelled. When, in 1303, the Order purchased the 
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castle of Cull a for the very high price of 500,000 solidi it had extended 
this hinterland west as far as the border of Aragon. 
Territories like this could help support initiatives in the East. 
Molay had, for example, been instrumental in establishing a force on 
the island ofRuad,just off the coast at Tortosa, which he apparently 
saw as a staging post for a more permanent presence on the mainland, 
as well as a meeting place with representatives of the Mongols with 
whom many Christians hoped to form an alliance. But Molay was 
well aware that such activity was no antidote to criticism. Indeed, 
the Ruad occupation did nothing to restore the Order's reputation, 
when in September, 1302, the island was overrun by the Mamluks, 
who killed or captured the entire garrison." The master would not 
have been surprised that , at the same time as he was explaining to 
Clement V the futility of creating a combined Order, Peter Dubois, 
an opinionated Norman lawyer keen to gain a placement within the 
French administration, was complaining that the military orders 
had misused what he saw as their vast incomes, and that the only 
way to promote the cause of the Holy Land was to unite the orders 
and force those members living in Cyprus to subsist from local 
resources rather than drawing on their European networks. Dubois. 
who paints a vivid picture of idleness and incompetence, believed 
that once it was generally known how much income the orders had, 
the evidence of their betrayal of the Holy Land would be clear for 
all to see,15 
On the evening of 18 May, 1291, as William of Beaujeu lay dying 
in the Templar house at Acre, the senior Templars around him had 
only two options, either to take to the sea and abandon the city to its 
fate or to fight to the last against an implacable enemy. Whatever his 
previous relations with the Muslims, Beaujeu had known that the 
new Mamluk Sultan, aI-Ashraf, was not interested in negotiation; 
the master's secretary himselftranslated and distributed the sultan's 
letter announcing his inrentions. J6 Witnesses to Templar bravery in 
defending Acre do not therefore in themselves invalidate William of 
Plaisians' claim that the knights should be judged by the results of 
their actions, for he meant that the stain of corruption extended far 
beyond the events of 1291. The people, Plaisians said, had suspected 
the Temple of illicit activities for so long that nobody could remember 
a time to the contrary.J7 
The Templar Rule in both the French and Catalan versions 
certainly acknowledges the possibility of apostasy. Rows among 
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Tempiars may not have been uncommon and threats, made m 
anger or wrath', CO go over to the Saracens, were certainly made, 
although, as far as can be seen, not very often acted on. The 
Aragonese Templars who fled into Muslim territory in 1307 and 1308 
did so in the exceptional circumstances of the impending trial; even 
then they may not have meant their exile to be permanent for it 
was a well-established practice in [be ria for secular nobles who had 
lost political favour to remove themselves from Christian territories 
until circumstances changed." In the East, the Rule draws attention 
to specific examples intended to demonstrate how the Order's 
disciplinary system dealt with such cases. Thus, brother Esteven, 
who worked as a blacksmith in the castle of Safed, had intended to 
desert and had actually stayed one night in a house garrisoned by 
Saracens, but rhe next day had regretted his action and went back to 
the Order, was srill sentenced to lose the habit for some unspeCified 
period, only escaping expulSion because the casal concerned had 
been under the command of Chrisrians.39 More serious was the 
case of Roger the German, captured at the battle of La Forbie in 
1244. At some point he was able to return to the Order, bur he was 
expelled for swearing an oath to renounce Christianity, even though 
he pleaded that he had not understood what the MU1limS had forced 
him to do. He was probably not believed, for they may have thought 
he owed his survival to some kind of promise of this nature." 
If there was some ambiguity about the attitudes of these two 
men, in another two cases apostasy appears to have been the clear 
intention. [n one incident, a mason-brother, called Jorge. fled from 
Acre with the intention of joining the Saracens. but he was pursued 
by other Templars sent by the master. They caught up with him and 
found that he had secular clothing under his habit. He was put in 
prison in the castle of Athlit. where he died." In the second case, at 
Athlit, 'there were brothers who practised wicked si n and caressed 
each other in their chambers at night; so those who knew of the 
deed and others who had suffered greatly by it, told this thing to 
the Master and to a group of worthy men of the house.' [n Acre 
they were sentenced to be imprisoned in heavy irons, but one of 
them. called Brother Lucas, 'escaped by night and went over to the 
Saracens.'\lZ 
[ndividual cases might be expected. but the surrender of a 
complete fortress involved a whole garrison. This was what 
happened at Baghras (Gaston) in the Amanus Mountains north of 
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AntioCh in 1268. Antioch itself had been held by the Christians since 
1098, when it had been captured by the armies of the First Crusade, 
but it had lasted only two days in the face of Mamluk forces, so it is 
understandable that the defenders ofBaghras were apprehensive. The 
situation was exacerbated when, while the others were dining, one 
of the Templars, Gins of Belin (who perhaps came from the locality), 
handed over the keys to the Su Itan, Baybars. After some discussion, 
Gueraut ofSaucet, the Commander, and the other brothers, decided 
to retreat to another of the marcher fortresses, La Roche Guillaume, 
after destroying everything in the castle which could be of use to 
the enemy. Unknown to them the convent at Acre had come to the 
same conclusion and sent a messenger to inform the commander. 
Even so, afterwards there was a long debate in the Order about what 
action should be taken against the Baghras garrison, as to abandon 
a marcher fortress without permission was an offence punishable by 
expulsion." In the end the brothers were given penance for failing 
to destroy all the goods in the castle before they left, which confirms 
the account of the Arab historian, Abu'l Fida, that they had fled in 
some haste, but the fact that expulsion was even considered despite 
the decision of the central convent and the stealing of the keys was 
meant to emphasise how seriously the Order regarded any action 
which could be interpreted as treacherous behaviour. 
The Templars may have been sensitive on this issue since, a 
century before, William of Tyre, their most trenchant twelfth-
century critic, alleged that a similar frontier fortress, which he 
described as 'an impregnable cave, lying beyond the Jordan on 
the borders of Arabia', had been surrendered by the Templars to 
Shirkuh, one ofthe lieutenants ofNur ai-Din, the ruler of Damascus 
and the most formidable enemy ofthe Christians. King Amalric had 
heard ofthe attack on the castle, but was only able to reach the River 
Jordan with a relief force when he heard that the place had fallen 
to the enemy. The king, never patient with what he regarded as 
insubordination, eVidently regarded this as treason and, despite the 
Templars' status as religious, had about twelve of them hanged." 
Such examples, though, are quite isolated in the overall sweep 
ofTemplar history. Set against this are the massive losses sustained 
by the Order in battles to defend the Holy Land. Deaths in the 
defeats at the Springs of Cresson and at Hattin in Galilee in u87 
amounted to 290 knights, while the great disasters of the 1240S, the 
battle of La Forbie, near Gaza, in 1244, and the crushing of Louis 
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IX's advance guard at Mansourah in the Nile Delta in 1250, led to 
the slaughter of 547 knights. These are huge numbers, given that 
the Order is unlikely to have had more than 600 knights available at 
anyone time in the crusader states and, even in crises such as these, 
some wou ld still have been needed to garrison castles. 4 S No figures 
are known for the sergeants who died alongside them, but they are 
unlikely to have been lower. In most circumstances the Templars 
adopted relatively cautious tactics, for their knights were a valuable 
resource not to be discarded lightly. Even so, Gerard of Ridefort, the 
Grand Master largely responsible for the Cresson defeat and, some 
believe, for the mistaken tactics which led to Hartin as well, was 
nevertheless remembered as one of the heroes of Templar history 
for his selflessness in refusing to abandon his colleagues in a battle 
outside Acre in October, n89. Acc<?rding to an anonymous account 
known as the Itinerariunt, probably written by an English crusader 
familiar with the Templars: 'The Lord had conferred such great glory 
on him, giving him the laurel wreath which he had earned in so 
many battles and making him a fellow of the college of martyrs.''' 
William of Plaisians had no evidence to show that the Templars 
had betrayed the Holy Land; the written version of .his speech is 
couched in the language of lawyers, for the Holy Land 'was said 
to have been lost' and the secret pacts 'are said often to have been 
made'. Nor can William of Nogaret's story be verified. During 
Saladin's time, the Mesopotamian chronicler, Ibn al-Athir, describes 
the Templars and the Hospitallers as 'the fiercest fighters of all 
the Franks', whom Saladin had executed after the battle of Hattin 
because 'he wished to rid the Muslims of their wickeclness .'47 Baha 
ad-Din Ibn Shadd ad, who was Saladin's qadi to the army from n88 
and was in a position to know if there had been any treasonable 
overtures from the Templars, mentions nothing. The master to 
whom Nogaret was referring can only have been Gerard of Ride fort, 
whose faults were evident to contemporaries. Arrogant. vengeful 
and impetuous he may have been, but his place in the pantheon of 
crusader martyrs was secure in the eyes of knights whose value 
system placed bravery and loyalty above all other qualities. Nor are 
the Muslim sources on the ra il of Acre willing to ascribe any part of 
the Mamluk success to Christian betrayal, for both Qalawun and 
aI-Ashraf are presented as determined to overcome this last major 
stronghold of the unbelievers who had invaded Islamic lands nearly 
two hundred years before. The slaughter ofthe inhabitants was seen 
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as justifiable revenge for the killing of Muslim captives outside Acre 
by Richard I when the city had been regained by the Christians in 
1191, while the destruction of the city showed that the Mamluks had 
no intention of ever again allowing the Latins to regain a position 
on the mainland. 48 
The French lawyers were trying to ride the currents of 
unpopularity which washed against those most closely connected to 
the defence of the holy places. Failure to stop the Mamluks was meant 
to demonstrate that the Templars were secretly undermining the faith 
at the very heart of the Ch ristian world. Yet for so many brothers to 
die to cover up the real purposes of the Templars is to stretch credulity 
beyond even the melodramas of Sir Walter Scott. In the words of an 
anonymous [ract, known as the Lamentacio. circulating in Paris in 1308 
during the proceedings against the Templars: 'It seems absurd and is 
almost unbelievable, or rather impossible, that in an Order so spread 
across the whole world that the noble brothers, clerks and burgesses, 
who for the safety of their souls had given themselves in obedience 
to the gloriOUS Virgin, wearing the cross in perpetuity on account of 
reverence to the Crucifixion and in memory of the Passion, should 
have been ensnared by such crimes.'49 
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